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C h i n a  A n a l y s i s
Can China’s policy toward Tibet become more flexi-ble? Reading the official Chinese press gives littlecause for optimism. Since the beginning of the trou-
bles on 14 March, Beijing has launched a full-scale informa-
tion war. Beijing’s official line — accusing the “Dalai Lama
clique” of a violent drift towards independence despite the
economic development Chinese policies have brought to the
Autonomous Region — is endlessly repeated in China and
abroad. The closing of the Autonomous Region to foreign-
ers has prevented an alternative version of events or any
measure of the extent of the repression. The overwhelming
majority of the Chinese media has rejected all debate over
the root cause of the riots. Our selection compares two con-
trasting texts. An article from the official Xinhua News
Agency spells out, for Chinese readers, the government’s ar-
guments supporting the thesis of a plot. The text is based on
a central argument that is often called into question abroad:
that the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile, who seek
autonomy, directly control the pro-independence groups.
The article from the Guangdong provincial weekly Nanfang
zhoumo, on the other hand, links the Tibetan riots to
China’s cultural policy in the region, an argument that is
unanimously accepted abroad. While the article serves as
evidence of this argument’s currency in Chinese liberal cir-
cles, taking such a position publicly remains risky; the author
was expelled from the newspaper in early May. 
China’s whole argument is based on a denunciation of the
Dalai Lama’s independence project, although the Dalai
Lama himself ceaselessly repeats his demands for nothing
more than the autonomy guaranteed in the Chinese Consti-
tution.((1) According to Xinhua, the Dalai Lama’s govern-
ment-in-exile is said to have decided, during a meeting in
Brussels in March 2007, to seize the opportunity of the
Olympic Games to provoke a crisis and focus the world’s at-
tention on the Tibetan cause. In concrete terms, the events
of March are said to result from an alliance between the
forces of the Dalai Lama and the most radical organisations
calling for independence, including the Tibetan Youth Con-
gress, the Association of Tibetan Women, and Students for
a Free Tibet. These organisations unveiled in the United
States their plan for “a great insurrectionary movement of
the Tibetan people,” based on the idea that 2008 is the
“last chance of success” for the independence of Tibet. In
India, pro-independence groups decided on a series of con-
crete measures and obtained the approval of the govern-
ment-in-exile. First of all there is a series of political de-
mands that, from China’s point of view, go well beyond de-
mands for autonomy: the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet,
the departure of Chinese colonists, and the liberation of po-
litical prisoners. Should China refuse to accede to these de-
mands, the plan calls for a resort to violence. The instigators
of the plan made no attempt at stealth; seven pro-independ-
ence associations presented its major points at two press con-
ferences in New Delhi in January 2008. Planned to begin
in March 2008, the insurrection was supposed to constitute
“an historic turning-point in Tibet’s struggle for freedom.”
Two dates were supposed to mark the intensification of Ti-
betan protest. Outside China, on 10 March, the Tibetan
Youth Congress began a peaceful march from India towards
the Tibet Autonomous Region. In other countries Tibetans
took a day off work to launch a range of actions, including
hunger strikes and attacks on embassies of the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC). In “Greater Tibet” — the Au-
tonomous Region along with the areas of historic Tibet an-
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Based on:
• Li Ping, Li Yajie, “Behind the orchestration by the Dalai Lama clique of the major insurrectionary movement in Tibet,”
Xinhua News Agency, 1 April 2008.
• Cao Xin, “Alternative thinking on the question of Tibet,” Nanfang zhoumo, 2 April 2008.
This  sec t ion,  prepared  by  the  As ia  Centre  (www.centreas ia .org) ,  draws  mainly  on  the  press  in  Chinese ,a iming  to  re f l e c t  the  po int  o f  v i ew  o f  the  People ’s  Republ i c  o f  China  on  inte rnat ional  quest ions  andissues  re lated  to  Greate r  China.
1. The principle of the autonomy of national autonomous areas is established in Article 30
of the Constitution of the PRC. Article 4 guarantees the equality of the nationalities in
China. 
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nexed to the provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai —
the riots began on 14 March. According to Xinhua, the gov-
ernment-in-exile’s Department of Security played a key role
in the coordination of operations and carried out command
and intelligence functions. On 17 March, in order to counter
China’s deployment of effective security measures, the gov-
ernment-in-exile is alleged to have decided on an operation
to repatriate the most active participants in the riots to
Dharamsala. The rest of the article attempts to prove the
role of the government-in-exile based on the arrest of an
unidentified Tibetan, who is alleged to have been entrusted
by the Department of Security with clandestine missions, in-
cluding setting up a network of informers in Tibet, collecting
intelligence, and distributing tracts about the Dalai Lama’s
activities abroad. According to the article, Chinese Public
Security forces found compromising documents at the al-
leged agent’s home, including reports and photographs of
the riots, which he was preparing to send to the Tibetan se-
curity services.
As with all official sources, the Xinhua article reveals a kind
of amazement at the riots. What can possibly explain Ti-
betans’ discontent with the economic development of their
region? Opened up by a railway line, the region is benefit-
ing from China’s growth. The entire Chinese public mes-
sage counters the ideologues of independence with the prag-
matists of development. Nanfang zhoumo is the one and
only media organ that seeks to identify Chinese policy to-
wards Tibet as a potential cause of insurrection.
As the weekly sees it, the power of religion in Tibetan daily
life and the population’s veneration of the Dalai Lama are
two unavoidable realities. China had better face them and
rely on its Constitution. Instead of perceiving the Tibetan
leader as a political threat and seeking to discredit him,
China should resolve to treat him as a religious leader. The
relative insolence of this statement is tempered by a call for
strict adherence to the domestic laws of the PRC. However,
Nanfang zhoumo calls for a real change in strategy, asking
the Chinese government to distinguish between the various
Tibetan groups abroad rather than rejecting all of them out
of hand. The article suggests that it would not be counterpro-
ductive for Beijing to adopt a policy of “smiling in order to
dissipate antagonism” towards the Tibetan exiles who fol-
lowed the Dalai Lama in his flight to India in 1959. They do
not all favour independence: they belong to a complex soci-
ety that has changed considerably since that time. Likewise,
China should make a clearer distinction between proponents
of non-violence who are asking for autonomy, and extremists
who preach violence in order to obtain independence.
But Nanfang zhoumo goes further, implicitly linking the
March riots with the policy of Zhang Qingli, who was ap-
pointed Party secretary of Tibet in 2006. Perhaps China
should draw on the policies of Guo Jinlong, now Mayor of
Beijing, who was Party secretary in the Autonomous Region
from 2000 to 2004. His moderate approach favoured stabil-
ity. In particular he guaranteed religious freedom to all — ex-
cept Party members — and distinguished normal ethnic and
religious activity from “separatist” acts. Since even Chinese
experts agree that many aspects of Tibetan religion are com-
patible with the Chinese dream of building a “harmonious
society,” why not build a new relationship with the Tibetans
on this basis? Buddhism in Tibet does not favour “extrem-
ist” behaviour. Therefore, according to the weekly, Tibet
must “be treated differently from other regions dominated by
ethnic minorities.” Without calling directly for dialogue,
Nanfang zhoumo suggests an adjustment in China’s political
line towards Tibet. It recalls that on 28 March, the Dalai
Lama published an “open letter to [his] Chinese brothers
and sisters” in the Western media, in which he committed
himself to not supporting independence and to opposing any
boycott of the Beijing Olympics. These two promises corre-
spond exactly with the demands expressed by Hu Jintao and
Wen Jiabao for the resumption of dialogue.•
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